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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to document the role that career engineers played in the investment 
strategies and eventual survival of an organization producing large high technology capital 
goods.  Using the theory of innovative enterprise developed by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000), 
we analyze the locus of strategic control and its interactions with the cognitive and behavioral 
dimensions of Rolls-Royce, nowadays a successful industrial firm.  The company has been 
analyzed during an intense period of radical changes in the ownership structure of the company 
that followed the firm’s misdemeanors.  Analysis of the role of engineers is paralleled with an 
analysis of what influence the firm’s exposure to the stock market had on its innovative 
activities.  The case analyzed shows that there was a clear lead by the engineering-related 
functions, while other functions had little say in important investment decisions.  Company 
decisions were driven by the creed of engineering excellence transmitted from generation to 
generation of engineers via the recruitment and apprentice systems that were at the basis of the 
company’s internal training policy.   3
 
Introduction 
Literature on the economics and management of innovation has pointed out that the introduction 
of new technologies requires a number of conditions to be met in order to be successful in the 
market (Freeman and Soete, 1997).  Top management support, financial commitment, functional 
integration, project championing, and a clear market target, have been identified as key enabling 
factors for the successful introduction of new technologies (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Rothwell, 
1992).  Research on innovation has greatly increased our understanding of the relevant 
organizational and technological dimensions of the innovation process.  Empirical studies on 
innovation have fed the promising literature on the evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) and the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959).  These two research 
traditions have put back history into the account of firm behavior and given appropriate weight 
and role to the internal workings of firms.  Specific weight is given to firm capabilities in 
identifying new opportunities and meeting them by integrating internal and external resources 
(Teece et al., 1997). 
 
Building on the resource-based view of firms, Teece et al. (1997), have put forward the dynamic 
capability approach.  They argued that the dynamic capability approach extends the resource-
based approach since it adds the dynamic perspective that was partly neglected.  Teece et al. 
contended that firms not only accumulate capabilities but also need to continuously reconfigure 
and integrate internal and external resources to compete effectively in an ever-changing 
environment.  Thus, a dynamic capability is the firm’s ability to reconfigure, redirect, transform, 
and integrate internal capabilities with external factors of production and resources to meet 
environmental challenges.  Defined in this way, a dynamic capability represents a super-order 
capability that pertains to strategic top management.  Teece et al. argued that an analysis of 
dynamic capabilities must focus on a firm’s position, its managerial and organizational 
processes, and paths available to it. 
 
This research tradition of the theory of the firm, however, said little or nothing on the locus of 
strategic control of resource allocation.  Specifically, the dynamic capabilities perspective said 
nothing on who sets the positions and therefore who controls the firms and what sustains the 
paths.  Reviewing Teece et al. (1997), Lazonick (2002: 15) argued “… they have nothing to say 
about who within the organization’s hierarchical and functional division of labor should make 
decisions to maintain the integration of strategy and learning and thereby sustaining the 
innovation process”.  The aim of this paper is to document the role that career engineers played 
in the investment strategies and eventual survival of an organization producing large high 
technology capital goods.  The theory of innovative enterprise developed by Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000) constitutes a good conceptual framework for an empirical analysis of the 
locus of strategic control and specifically of its interactions with the cognitive and behavioral 
dimensions (see also O’Sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2003).  Our analysis is 
focused on Rolls-Royce, nowadays a successful industrial firm that has produced aircraft 
engines since its inception and was driven out of the market precisely because of the not entirely 
appropriate timing of a technological bet.  The company has been analyzed during an intense 
period of radical changes in the ownership structure of the company that followed the firm’s 
wrongdoings. 
   4
 
Analysis of the engineers’ role is paralleled with analysis of the influence of the firm’s exposure 
to the stock market on its innovative activities.  The idea we pursued was to create two rival 
explanations to enlighten the success of Rolls-Royce.  We therefore employed the pattern-
matching tactic (Yin, 1994) to assess, compare and then ponder the role of engineers against that 
of the stock exchange.  This tactic has permitted us not to become too one-dimensional in 
finding explanations for the successful and unsuccessful decisions taken by the company. 
 
The case analyzed shows that there was a clear lead by the engineering-related functions, while 
other functions had little say in important investment decisions.  Company decisions were driven 
by the creed of engineering excellence transmitted from generation to generation of engineers 
via the recruitment and apprentice systems that are at the basis of the company’s internal training 
policy.  In fact, most if not all of Rolls-Royce’s top managers had extensive engineering 
background and therefore “had intimate knowledge of the problems and possibilities of the 
enterprise’s investment strategies” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2001, p. 10).  On the other hand, 
whatever else Rolls-Royce has been doing since privatization, the company clearly has not been 
creating value for shareholders. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes how Rolls-Royce’s attempt to 
develop the three-shaft engine for Lockheed at the end of the 1960s resulted in bankruptcy.  
Then we detail how, as a nationalized company from February 1971 to May 1987, Rolls-Royce 
continued to develop the three shaft-engine, first as an add-on to its military efforts and then in 
the 1980s as a critical capability in preparation for privatization.  The use of financial markets in 
general and the stock market in particular to sustain the development of such an engine is also 
detailed.  The final section considers the implications of the Rolls-Royce case for understanding 
the impact of communities of practitioners on the control of resource allocation for development 
of innovative capabilities and eventually on a firm’s survival. 
 
Research method 
This single case study draws on qualitative and quantitative data.  Data were gathered through 
research in both primary and secondary sources.  These distinct types of data were employed in 
this study to establish construct validity (Yin, 1994).  Multiple data sources enabled us to obtain 
stronger substantiation of constructs by triangulating evidence across cases (Yin, 1994). 
 
The first type of information was gathered from a systematic review of the technical literature, 
trade publications, specialized engineering journals, and databases on financial data.  Specific 
attention was paid to the analysis of Rolls-Royce’s annual reports and publications.  This first 
type of data was used to provide background information and to sketch an overall picture of the 
historical evolution of the company through the development of the firm’s technological 
capabilities in the RB211 engine program.  The second type of information came from 
interviews carried out with industry experts and company engineers. 
 
The analysis of the combination of these two types of data enabled us to scrutinize the resource 
allocation process in relation to the development of technological capabilities in Rolls-Royce.  
We employed the pattern-matching tactic to analyze the data using two rival explanations (Yin, 
1994).  According to Yin, this tactic “requires the development of rival theoretical 
propositions…The important characteristic of these rival explanations is that each involves a   5
 
pattern of independent variables that is mutually exclusive: if one explanation is to be valid, the 
others cannot be.  This means that the presence of certain independent variables (predicted by 
one explanation) precludes the presence of other independent variables (predicted by a rival 
explanation)” (1994, p. 108).  The first explanation we developed was based on the role of career 
engineers, while the other was based on the role of the stock exchange. 
 
As discussed in the literature on research methods, single case studies do have a number of 
limitations.  Specifically, the generalizability of the findings of case studies is largely impaired 
by the fact that cases are selected and not sampled.  The Rolls-Royce case was selected in the 
same way that a laboratory investigator selects experiments (Yin, 1994).  As Yin (1994, p. 31) 
suggested, the method of generalization from case studies is analytic generalization, “in which a 
previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of 
the case study”.  This method of generalization differs from statistical generalization, where data 
related to a sample form the basis for inferences about a population. 
 
On the other hand, case studies play a significant role in a theory building exercise (Eisenhardt, 
1989) that ought to be tested using other methods: the development of evolutionary theory in 
biology was in fact based on a case study.  Also, this case study is part of a larger study which 
using the same analytical framework, analyzed a larger number of case studies.  Hence, we 
followed a comparative case-study research approach, often employed in the strategic 
management and innovation literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Doz, 1996).  
This approach builds an analysis of the process to be studied by comparing new cases, added 
sequentially rather than simultaneously, to an initial model case – that is, one that exemplifies 
the success (or failure) of a company in the particular phenomenon that is the focus of study.  In 
effect, through the discovery of critical exceptions to the explanation of success (or failure) to 
what, before the addition of the last case study, had been seen to be the rule, the model that we 
develop to explain the phenomenon under investigation gains analytical sophistication. 
 
 
The origins of the RB211 and the bankruptcy of Rolls-Royce 
The British national context 
Already in the mid-1940s Rolls-Royce had proved to be the most successful and competent 
British aircraft engine firm. Unlike vertically integrated competitors such as de Havilland and 
Siddeley Armstrong Motors, Rolls-Royce was an independent engine supplier that could seek 
orders from any of the airframers.   Rationalization of the industry occurred between the end of 
the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.  A series of combinations reduced the number of 
airframers to three -- Hawker Siddeley Group, British Aircraft Corporation, and Westland 
Aircraft – and engine manufacturers to two -- Rolls-Royce and Bristol Siddeley Engines.  Then 
in 1966, when it appeared that Bristol Siddeley would join with SNECMA to build the Pratt & 
Whitney JT9D engine for the Airbus, Rolls-Royce acquired Bristol-Siddeley, and thus became 
the only British aircraft engine company that could contemplate competing in global markets 
(Pugh, 2001, 94-102).  Both Bristol Siddeley Engines and the government (which had 
recommended the merger of the two companies in the Plowden Report) welcomed the take-over. 
 
The three-shaft engine architecture   6
 
The development of Rolls-Royce’s civil business rested on two important decisions: (1) to 
develop a large turbofan aircraft engine, and (2) to break into the United States market.  In 1965 
a study indicated an expanding future market for engines rated over 30,000lb.  At Rolls-Royce 
the first program for a larger turbofan engine was based on the two-shaft Conway turbofan 
engine.  The engine, labelled RB178, was rated at 28,500lb and had a relatively low by-pass 
ratio.  The company’s view was that the fuel consumption benefits of a high by-pass ratio would 
be more than offset by the fuel consumption costs attributable to the larger size of the fan, the 
greater weight of the engine, and the higher installed drag that a high by-pass ratio would entail 
(Cownie, 1989; Pugh, 2001). 
 
Such a view changed, however, when “tests in the US demonstrated that the installed drag 
penalty of the nacelle was less than half that assumed in European studies” (Ruffles, 1992, 3).  
As a result, the by-pass ratio of the RB178 was increased up to 8, which in turn led Rolls-
Royce’s engineers to choose “a three-shaft configuration as the best for both aerodynamic and 
mechanical reasons” (Ruffles, 1992, 4).  This design layout, labeled RB178-51, would provide 
much higher thrust than the previous RB178.  A demonstrator program was launched to test the 
new technological solution, with the first engine test run taking place in July 1966 (Cownie, 
1989).  The tests revealed a number of mechanical defects related to the revolutionary character 
of the three-shaft architecture.  A shortage of finance meant that the demonstrator program was 
dropped.  Meanwhile, Rolls-Royce started a smaller three-shaft engine program, the Trent, 
which permitted the company to gain some experience on a lower-rated version of a three-shaft 
engine.  The Trent program was, however, cancelled in 1968.  As reported by Cownie (1989, 
232), “many believed that some of the problems later experienced in RB211 development could 
have been solved earlier if running had continued with the RB178 demonstrator”. 
 
When Boeing launched the 747 in 1968, Rolls-Royce submitted an engine proposal (the RB178-
51) to power the widebody aircraft (Ruffles, 1992).  Boeing selected the Pratt & Whitney JT9D, 
however, mainly because of its larger size.  After failing to sell the RB178-51 to Boeing, Rolls-
Royce became even more convinced that the future of its aircraft engine business depended on 
the development of large turbofan engines.  Forecast studies showed that sales of Rolls-Royce’s 
existing engines would fall from £58.9 million in 1969 to £3.5 million in 1975, and revenues 
from the aftermarket from £36.5 to £31.9 million (Cownie, 1989).  Towards the end of the 
1960s, Rolls-Royce had in place two large three-shaft engine projects, namely the RB207 and 
the RB211. The RB207 was the larger one, rated at over 50,000lb and proposed for the twin-
engined European Airbus, US jumbo jets, and the BAC Two-eleven projects.  The RB211 was 
relatively smaller, rated at 30,000lb, and proposed for three-engined airliners. 
 
Development of the RB211 
In June 1967, Rolls-Royce entered into negotiations with Lockheed to manufacture the RB211, 
rated at 33,260lb, for its projected L-1011 three-engined widebody aircraft (Pugh, 2001, ch. 4).    
The Rolls-Royce marketing team (led by David Huddie) focused its campaign on technological 
superiority and lower prices.  Technological superiority was supposed to derive from not only 
the revolutionary three-shaft architecture but also the all-composite (Hyfil) fan blade.  These 
technological advances would result in an engine that was “lighter, cheaper to run, simpler in 
construction (with 40 per cent fewer component parts) and easier to maintain than existing turbo-
fan engines” (Gray, 1971, 84).  Also, given lower wages in Britain and the further devaluation of   7
 
the British pound against the US dollar, the RB211 engine was offered at £203,000 compared 
with £250,000 for the General Electric engine and £280,000 for the Pratt & Whitney engine.  
Pratt & Whitney pulled out of the race, while General Electric cut its price to £240,000.  After 
tough and intense negotiations, Rolls-Royce won the contract by cutting its price to just under 
£200,000  (Reed, 1973).  Lockheed announced the launch order for the RB211 in March 1968.  
Lockheed ordered 150 ‘ship sets’ of RB211 engines (totalling 450 engines), with TWA and 
Eastern Air Lines as launch airline customers.  Air Holding of the United Kingdom ordered 50 
Lockheed aircraft, which was politically advantageous for Rolls-Royce because it offset the 
offshore purchase of British engines and therefore helped the US balance of payments (Cownie, 
1989). 
 
The news of the Lockheed deal was very well received in Britain.  Anthony Wedgwood Benn, 
Minister of Technology in the Labour government, stated that the contract was “a terrific boost 
to British technology and its export potential” (quoted in Gray, 1971, 86).  Also the City 
welcomed the deal, and Rolls-Royce’s share prices moved up from £2.225 to £2.35, adding £30 
million to Rolls-Royce’s market value (Reed, 1973).  As pointed out by Gray (1971, 86), 
however, the optimism was based on the mistaken assumption that, through the company’s 
newly developed computer centre, “Rolls-Royce’s success was due to the careful control of 
costs”.  In fact, Rolls-Royce’s success in securing the contract was based on price cutting, a 
strategy that, as Gray (1971, 86), put it, “did not require a computer”. 
 
The development of the RB211 was unique for Rolls-Royce. As Harker (1976, 176) summed it 
up: “This was a mammoth task; the engine itself was much bigger in overall dimension than 
anything the company had produced before; it was a different shape and the diameter of the fan 
was eighty-six inches, which necessitated large machinery to cut metal and required new 
techniques in welding” (see also Cownie, 1989, 234).  The task became even more complex 
when the design specifications of the engine were modified to accommodate changes in the 
design of the aircraft.  By the time the engine was ordered, aircraft performance requirements 
had increased, with the thrust required from the RB211 rising to 40,600lb.  In 1972, the thrust 
requirement climbed again to 42,000lb because of increased weight of both aircraft and engine.  
This thrust was twice that of the largest engine that Rolls-Royce had previously produced. 
 
The government’s initial contribution was 70% of the launching costs of the RB211, totalling 
around £47 million.  It was an exceptional contribution since the government had set a limit to 
launching aid at “normally not more than 50%” of the launching costs (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1972, Annex A).
i To make things worse, the initial launching costs had been seriously 
underestimated.  The yet unproven technologies being introduced in the RB211 resulted in 
soaring development costs.  First, the Hyfil carbon fiber that made up the fan blades failed the 
so-called ‘bird strike test’.  The fiber was reinforced to strengthen the leading edge of the blades, 
but this solution caused stresses at the root of the blade (Gray, 1971).  As a result, the all-
composite fan blade was abandoned, and the ‘old’ solid titanium blades with snubbers were 
reintroduced.  This change, however, added 300lb to the weight of the engine, thus necessitating 
expensive redesign work.  The sheer size of the engine also required the construction of new 
testing facilities.  As a result, the progress of the program was delayed, and it became highly 
likely that Rolls-Royce would incur the heavy late-delivery penalties that the Lockheed contract 




Rolls-Royce financial situation started deteriorating towards the end of 1969.  In May 1970, 
Rolls-Royce asked the Industrial Reorganization Corporation for a loan of £10 million.  Changes 
in management were made: first Lord Beeching and Ian Morrow joined the board; then Sir 
David Huddie, one of the architects of the successful RB211 campaign, stepped down and Hugh 
Conway (from the Bristol division) replaced him.  Also, 3,500 men were made redundant and a 
small factory (employing 100 men) was closed down.  In November 1970, in the face of Rolls-
Royce’s mounting financial difficulties and a revised estimate of the launching costs of the 
RB211 to £135 million, the government increased its launching aid by a further £42 million, its 
total contribution of £89 million representing 66 % of the revised cost estimate.  In addition, the 
Bank of England agreed to lend £8 million to Rolls-Royce, while Midland Bank and Lloyds 
Bank each lent £5 million with the stipulation that they would each have a representative on the 
Rolls-Royce board (Department of Trade and Industry 1972, 7–8; Bowden, 2002, 50).  This £60 
million financial package was, however, subject to a reassessment of the development program 
(Department of Trade and Industry 1972).  A further change was made to the Rolls-Royce 
management.  Sir Denning Pearson, Rolls-Royce Chairman and another architect of the RB211 
campaign, stepped down and was replaced by Lord Cole, who had just retired from Unilever. 
 
Notwithstanding changes in management, redundancies and augmented financial aid from the 
British Government, Rolls-Royce was not able to overcome the problems with the RB211 
development program.  Rolls-Royce internal assessments (reported to the Ministry of Aviation 
Supply) showed that due to a number of design modifications and subsequent changes in the 
production process, development and production targets could not be met.  These delays meant a 
postponement of at least six months for engine deliveries (Department of Trade and Industry, 
1972).  The Department of Trade and Industry estimated that “a further £110 million cash flow 
would be required, as compared with the £60 million estimated in September 1970” (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 1972, 11).  The incoming Conservative government that, while in 
opposition, “had adopted a policy of ‘disengagement’ from industry with references to the need 
to end public support for ‘lame ducks’” (Hayward, 1989, 138), had to decide whether to continue 
to support Rolls-Royce financially or allow it to go bankrupt.  They opted for the second 
alternative and on 4
th February 1971, Rolls-Royce went into receivership. 
 
What went wrong?  The problems were technical, financial, managerial, and contractual.  The 
use of Hyfil carbon fiber for fan blades turned out to be a failure.  Also, the technological 
viability of the RB211’s revolutionary three-shaft architecture had yet to be demonstrated.  As 
mentioned earlier, the RB178 demonstrator program had been cancelled due to financial 
shortage, leaving the design team dependent on parametric studies of the Spey and smaller 
turbo-fan engines.  Worse still, the premature death of Adrian Lombard deprived Rolls-Royce of 
one of the finest ‘trouble shooting’ engineers in the industry (Hayward, 1989, 137). 
 
At the time that the RB211 program was launched, Rolls-Royce was involved in the 
development of the larger RB207 engine for the European Airbus as well as in a number of 
military programs (Harker, 1976).  Although the two civil engines shared a common architecture 
and several design features, “development of two large engines, and especially the RB211 to 
Lockheed’s stringent contract terms, was straining [Rolls-Royce’s] resources” (Hayward, 1989,   9
 
136).  Also, the acquisition of Bristol Siddeley Engines absorbed financial resources; Rolls-
Royce’s purchase of Bristol cost £63.6 million, £26.6 million of which was paid in cash to 
Hawker Siddeley Aircraft (Hayward, 1989, 123).  The valuation included about £20 million in 
‘goodwill’ and shares in British Aircraft Corporation and Westland, which Rolls-Royce later 
sought unsuccessfully to sell.  The Bristol acquisition placed considerable demands upon 
managerial resources for rationalizing the engine divisions.  In fact, Rolls-Royce would have to 
provide additional capital to support the Bristol side of the business at a time when its own 
liquidity was under pressure from its fateful contract with Lockheed.   Hayward (1989, 123) 
stated that “[w]ith hindsight, it is evident that the determination to prevent P&W [Pratt & 
Whitney] obtaining a European foothold led Rolls into a precipitated and ill-judged act.   
Although the merger [with Bristol Siddeley] was not the main cause of Rolls’ later problems, it 
would be a significant contributory factor.” 
 
As for the Lockheed contract, the main problem was that Rolls-Royce had agreed to a relatively 
low fixed price with, as Hayward (1989, 136) put it, “strict and onerous penalties for delay, 
giving Rolls very little leeway in the event of serious technical or financial problems.”   
Similarly, Harker (1976, 186) emphasized that “[s]ix hundred engines were contracted, but the 
price did not make sufficient allowance for the unexpected inflation that ensued in the economy 
or the unanticipated development costs that arose.” 
 
Engineer control: a two-edged sword 
“A basic engineering training is a good training for management and for top engineering 
decisions” (quoted in Gray, 1971, 75).  This statement, attributed to Sir Denning Pearson 
summarizes Rolls-Royce’s management philosophy.  Several commentators underlined the fact 
that Rolls-Royce was an engineering company run by engineers who were devoted to 
engineering excellence.  This value informed every single allocative decision taken within the 
firm.  Engineering excellence was pursued strenuously, sometimes irrespective of time and cost 
constraints.  As mentioned by an industry expert, allegedly, having laid their hands on a Pratt & 
Whitney engine, Rolls-Royce engineers were appalled by the crudity of the engineering 
solutions embedded in the engine.  They were also appalled, however, by the fact that the 
competitor’s engine worked. 
 
Rolls-Royce was a paternalistic company that was run by and for its long-time employees, 
especially its engineers.  To get a job in Rolls-Royce was made easier if the applicant had a 
relative already working for the company.  Employees tended to stay with the company for their 
entire working lives.  This attachment occurred not only at the top management level, but also on 
the shop floor.  As underlined by Gray (1971, 75): “Before Rolls-Royce merged with Bristol 
Siddeley in 1966 only one of their eight directors had been with them for less than twenty-five 
years.  Such links with the past were to be found on every level: in 1964 over a third of the 
workers in the Derby factory had been employed there since before the Second World War.”  
Also, Rolls-Royce did not adopt job rotation policies, so that engineers tended to stay within the 
same department for years, and sometimes decades, with the likelihood that they would become 
experts in a specific component and/or subsystem of the aircraft engine. 
 
Inspired by the culture of engineering excellence, Rolls-Royce’s engineers maintained a solid 
grip on the resource allocation process during the early stage of the development of the RB211.    10
 
This grip, however, started being questioned when Rolls-Royce went bankrupt and later during 
the nationalization era. 
 
The era of nationalization 
Emergence from bankruptcy 
On the same day that the Rolls-Royce Receiver was appointed, Frederick Corfield, the Ministry 
of Aviation Supply stated:  “To ensure continuity of those activities of Rolls-Royce which are 
important to our national defence, to our collaborative programs with other countries and to 
many air forces and civil airlines all over the world, the Government has decided to acquire such 
assets of the aero-engine and marine and industrial gas turbine engine divisions of the company 
as they may be essential for these purposes” (quoted in Department of Trade and Industry, 1972, 
14).  A new company, Rolls-Royce (1971) Limited was therefore formed that took control of the 
assets of Rolls-Royce acquired by the government (Department of Trade and Industry 1972). 
 
At that point the development of the RB211 was almost cancelled.  But Lord Carrington, the 
Minister of Defence, commissioned a technical and cost study that involved veteran Rolls-Royce 
engineers Fred Morley, Stanley Hooker, and Arthur Rubbra and that gave an optimistic 
assessment of the RB211 (Pugh, 2001, 230).  The study argued that the RB211’s development 
problems could be overcome with a six-month delay and a cash flow injection of a further £120 
million (Department of Trade and Industry, 1972).  According to Gunston (1997, 195), the 
nationalized company took “the RB211 on board, funded on a cheeseparing daily basis.”  The 
British government entered talks with Lockheed to renegotiate the RB211 contract.  After a 
lengthy negotiation involving the British and the US governments, Rolls-Royce (1971) Limited 
and Lockheed signed a new contract for the completion of the RB211 program.  Under this new 
agreement, Lockheed agreed to buy RB211 engines at increased prices.  Meanwhile, the US 
Senate had authorized a Federal rescue package for Lockheed, and the British government 
provided the necessary cash to complete the RB211 program. 
 
According to the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding that outlined the relationship between 
the British government and Rolls-Royce, the government, as the sole shareholder, maintained 
ultimate control over strategic planning and financial issues related to the launch of new engine 
development programs (Hayward, 1989).  In particular, “any investment decisions over £25 
million (US$41 million) had to be referred back to the government for approval” (Verchère, 
1992, 33).  The government was, however, not involved in the company’s day-to-day 
management, although the Rolls-Royce board agreed to keep it informed about its operations 
(Hayward, 1989).   
 
A number of the Government appointees to the new board of Rolls-Royce (1971) Limited were 
clearly supporters of the RB211 program.  They included Sir William Cook, a former scientific 
advisor to the Ministry of Defence, and Sir St John Elstub, Chairman of Imperial Metal 
Industries, both of whom had already advised the Heath government on the viability of the 
RB211 (Pugh, 2001, 234-235).  Yet, as summed up by Hayward (1989, 140), the bankruptcy and 
bailout entailed a dramatic challenge to engineer control: 
 
[I]t was soon evident that Rolls required a long period of convalescence and a sharp taste 
of internal reform.  Pearson, Huddie and the Rolls board took the full brunt of the post   11
 
mortem.  There had been fatal flaws in Rolls’ management structure and the dominance 
of engineers at the top of the company was singled out for particular criticism. As one 
Rolls man would later put it, “the first thing we had to learn was that the company was 
not just a playground for engineers to amuse themselves”. 
 
Rolls-Royce had to be rebuilt and Sir Kenneth Keith’s appointment as chairman in 
September 1972 marked the start of the process.  According to Sir Stanley Hooker, Sir 
Kenneth found a lack of discipline which appalled him and took on a seven-year stint which 
would lay the conditions for Rolls’ revival. 
 
Engineer control and bureaucratic interference  
With government and board support for the RB211 program, engineers regained complete 
control over the evolution of the program itself.  In the aftermath of the bankruptcy, a number of 
Rolls-Royce’s most illustrious engineers had come out of retirement.  Among them was Sir 
Stanley Hooker, who, among other things, had led the development of the engine for Concorde 
while working at Bristol Aero Engines (Pugh, 2001, 90-92).  Hooker became both Technical 
Director and a member of the Rolls-Royce board of directors with the charge of getting the 
RB211 program back on track.  Cyril Lovesey and Arthur Rubbra, both well over 70 years old, 
worked with Hooker as what he called “a kind of Chief of Staff committee” (Pugh, 2001, 235, 
quoting from Hooker 1984).  
 
When the Labour government took office in 1974, however, the spectre of bureaucratic 
interference reappeared.  Rolls-Royce was put under the control of the National Enterprise Board 
(NEB) whose role was to overlook the company’s operations.  Indeed Rolls-Royce was the main 
holding of NEB, which in turn came to symbolise Labour’s foray into industrial policy.  Rolls-
Royce management disliked this intrusion; Sir Kenneth Keith, its chairman believed that the 
National Enterprise Board added a redundant bureaucratic layer between Rolls-Royce and the 
government (Hayward, 1989, 159).
ii Tony Benn, as Minister of Trade and Industry after Labour 
returned to power in February 1974, had his first meeting with the Rolls-Royce Chairman in 
March of that year.  Keith told Benn that when he had accepted the Rolls-Royce position in 1972 
he had told the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, that he would “take it on so long as I am not 
buggered about by junior Ministers and civil servants and officials.”  Benn responded that 
“while I am in charge I will not accept chairmen of nationalized industries indicating to me that 
they won’t be mucked about by junior Ministers and civil servants: Rolls-Royce is a nationalized 
company and must be accountable for what it does.” 
 
During 1979, over a period that included the election of the Thatcher government in May, there 
was open hostility between Sir Kenneth Keith and the NEB Chairman, Sir Leslie Murphy.  In 
late 1979 Murphy told Sir Keith Joseph, Thatcher’s Minister of Industry, that the Rolls-Royce 
Chairman should be sacked in the light of the company’s poor financial performance.
iii In the 
event, Sir Kenneth retired as chairman, while Sir Keith took control of Rolls-Royce away from 
the NEB (resulting in the resignation of the entire NEB board), and placed the company in the 
hands of the Department of Industry.
iv 
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Worsening financial performance and the GE deal 
In 1980 Rolls-Royce’s 1000
th RB211 went into production.  But from 1979 the company’s 
financial situation worsened.  With uncovered foreign exchange as the value of the pound 
appreciated under the first Thatcher government as well as a prolonged strike, Rolls-Royce 
recorded losses of £58 million in 1979 (Pugh, 2001, 299).  A severe recession in the civilian 
aerospace industry in the early 1980s meant persistent losses for Rolls-Royce.  In 1983 Rolls-
Royce lost £193 million, and in 1983 and 1984 delivered only 126 new RB211s, even though the 
“worst-case” scenario in the company’s 1982 plan had been 350 engines (Pugh 2001, 297, 304).  
Between 1980 and 1984 Rolls-Royce cut its labour force from 62,000 to 41,000, mainly through 
voluntary severance and with no industrial disputes (Pugh, 2001, 300, 321, 325). 
 
From 1971 to 1979, Rolls-Royce reportedly had received £425m in state aid.
v From 1979 
through 1988 successive governments provided Rolls-Royce with £437 million in launch aid, of 
which £118 million was repaid from sales levies (Hayward, 1989).  The new chairman, Sir Frank 
McFadzean, appointed at the end of 1979, stated, however, that “as a chairman of this company I 
have no intentions of going and clearing everything with civil servants; otherwise I would never 
run the company.  You would never run a business on that basis” (quoted in Hayward, 1989, 
160). 
 
In 1984, however, in the aftermath of a string of unprofitable years stretching back to 1979, 
Rolls-Royce entered into two risk-and-revenue-sharing partner agreements with General Electric 
(GE) whereby GE took a 15 % stake in the development of the medium-sized RB535E4 engine 
to power the Boeing 757, while Rolls took a 15 % stake in the development of a GE engine 
designed to exceed 60,000lb (Pugh, 2001, 311-319).  As reported in an article entitled “Rolls 
faces up to reality” that appeared in the Financial Times the day after the agreement was 
announced: “By swapping a share in one of its new engine’s for a stake in one of General 
Electric’s, Rolls has finally moved away from the course which it has followed in the civil 
engine market for the past 20 years – a course which has taken this proud engineering company 
into bankruptcy, and which more recently has left it with an increasingly weak position in the 
market for high thrust commercial engines” (Lambert and Makinson, 1984, 16).  The article cites 
Ralph Robins, who was at the time Director – Civil Engines, as saying (in the words of the 
journalists) “that to develop the RB-211 series up to the [60,000lb+] size range would have 
effectively required the designers to start with a clean sheet of paper.  On this basis the project 
could have cost $1-1/2bn or more”.   
 
As a journalist was to write from the vantage point of 1990 on the eve of the first test of the 
Trent engine, the 1984 RRSP deal had been made because the company’s new Chairman, Sir 
William Duncan, “believed that any attempt by Rolls to go it alone in developing high-thrust 
engines would threaten a repetition of the 1971 RB211 crisis.  His answer was for Rolls to stay 
in the game by opting for minority partnership with one of it American rivals”
 (Lorenz, 1990).  
Or as another journalist, also writing in 1990, remarked, looking back at the Duncan agreement, 
“implicit in the deal was the understanding that Rolls would stay out of the big engine end of the 
market – shutting it out of the highest growth area and limiting it to a subordinate role” (Crooks, 
1990, 10).
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The reversal of strategy: the RB211 thrust growth capability 
By 1986, however, some two years after agreeing to the high-thrust RRSP with GE, Rolls-Royce 
was marketing its own high-thrust engine, the RB211-524D4D in direct competition with not 
only Pratt and Whitney’s PW-4000 but also GE’s CF6-80C2, in which Rolls-Royce still had a 
15 % stake.  In August 1986, much to the displeasure of General Electric, the RB211-524 
secured a £600 million order from British Airways for its new long-range jumbo jets.  GE 
claimed that its pact with Rolls-Royce precluded its “partner” from bidding for the BA order.  
Rolls-Royce disagreed (Donne and Cassell, 1986).  Subsequently the GE-Rolls high-thrust 
RRSP fell apart, with the collaboration being terminated in November 1986 (Crooks, 1990; 
Pugh. 2001, 314-319). 
 
Why the reversal of strategy?  The improvement in the market for turbofan engines from 1985 
clearly had much to do with it; in 1986 Rolls-Royce had pretax profits of £120 million and 
outstanding orders worth £3.1 billion (Pugh, 2001, 323).  Rolls-Royce’s engineers also found, 
over the course of 1984 and 1985, that, because of the modularity embedded in the three-shaft 
architecture, they could upgrade the RB211 for the big-engine market without increasing the fan 
diameter, with dramatic savings in development costs compared with Robins’ earlier estimate 
(Pugh 2001, 314).  Whether or not a change in the top management of Rolls-Royce was a factor 
in the reversal of strategy is difficult to say.  In late October 1984, some eight months after the 
high-thrust RRSP, Duncan, the Rolls-Royce architect of the agreement, announced that, as of 
December 1, Ralph Robins would become Managing Director of the company, the number two 
position. A week after the announcement, Duncan suddenly died at the age of 61.  He was 
replaced as Chairman by Sir Francis Tombs, who had been appointed to the Rolls-Royce board 
as a non-executive director in 1982, and hence was involved in the direction of the company 
when the pact with GE had been made.  From the perspective of 1990, Tombs was able to argue 
that the agreement with GE “was leading us nowhere.  The decision to pull out was a watershed” 
(quoted in Lorenz, 1990).  As a result of the reversal of the decision to take a subordinate role to 
GE in the development of the high-thrust engine, Rolls-Royce increased its market share of the 
world civil engine market from 5 % at the time of its 1987 privatization to 20 % in 1990.  The 
basis of the company’s success was, as Crooks (1990) put it, “Rolls’ massive advantage in 
having the RB211 engine.”  As Lorenz (1990) summarised these advantages that, by 1990, had 
resulted in the Trent engine: 
 
“… the RB211 engine core, whose development costs put the company into receivership, 
has become the key to its survival and success.  Its revolutionary design, using three 
shafts rather than Pratt and GE’s two, has proved so flexible that in successive 
upgradings since 1971 the engine power has been doubled without incurring the huge 
expense of significant design changes.”   
 
The three-shaft is shorter than two-shaft engines, more rigid and therefore more durable.  It 
wears less in service, preserving its outstanding fuel economy over its full life.  Along the 
way Rolls developed a new, wide fan blade, the “wide-chord” fan, which needs fewer blades 
to produce the same, or more, power, and is quieter and more fuel-efficient than 
conventional fans.  Only with the Trent did the original RB211 fan diameter have to be 
increased, but no other fundamental change has been made.  As a result, the Trent 
development is likely to cost about £400 (with about 25% being funded by Rolls’ partners in   14
 
the project, including BMW and two Japanese companies).  By contrast, industry estimates 
suggest the GE90 project will cost more than £1 billion. 
 
Corporate control and financial markets 
Privatization, restructuring, and reorganization 
From 1979 Thatcher administration had wanted to privatise Rolls-Royce as part of the Tory 
policy “to reduce government intervention in industry and to spread ‘popular capitalism’ through 
wider share ownership” (Hayward, 1989, 160).  As one minister put it, “the business of 
aerospace must pay its way.  Defence considerations apart, there is no reason why aerospace 
should not be subject to the financial disciplines and opportunities of the marketplace”.  Or in 
the words of Norman Tebbit, the Minister of Industry who succeeded Keith Joseph, “the 
aerospace industry is for making profits, it is not a form of occupational therapy” (both quoted in 
Hayward, 1989, 160).   
 
With losses piling up in the early 1980s, Rolls-Royce was not yet ready to throw away the 
protection of government ownership.  But in late 1984 a recovery in the civil aerospace markets 
began, and in 1985 and 1986 Rolls-Royce posted substantial profits.  In May 1987 Rolls-Royce 
was privatized with the flotation raising £1.36 billion for the government for the sale of its 
shares to the public. In addition, at the request of Sir Francis Tombs, Rolls-Royce’s newly 
appointed Chairman, the government authorised an additional share issue that injected £283 
million.  Notwithstanding the privatization, the British government retained in perpetuity a 
‘golden share’ of Rolls-Royce that gave it the power to veto any takeover attempt.  In an effort 
to limit the possibility of such a situation arising, the privatization limited foreign ownership of 
Rolls-Royce to 15 % of its outstanding shares on a first come, first served basis (Hayward 1989).  
This limitation on foreign ownership was challenged by the European Commission, and was 
subsequently increased to 29.5 % in 1989 and then to 49.5 % in 1998.
vi 
 
Once privatized, Rolls-Royce searched for productivity gains through significant organizational 
restructuring that entailed focusing on core businesses, outsourcing, downsizing, and cost-
cutting schemes.  This restructuring was pursued with the aim of making the customer, 
especially civil airlines, central to the strategy of the company.  Restructuring also involved an 
increasing involvement of suppliers and universities as partners in development and research 
programs.  Organizational restructuring was pursued also via several internal programs informed 
by lean manufacturing, total quality control, and business process re-engineering principles.  The 
aims of these programs were to improve the efficiency of business processes throughout the 
company and to modify the management structure to improve accountability.  At the beginning 
of the 1990s, Rolls-Royce embarked on an internal quality-enhancing program, labeled Project 
2000.  The program was clearly inspired by the Japanese quality movement and aimed at 
identifying and eliminating the firm’s business processes that did not add value (Verchère, 
1992). 
 
The supplier base was also rationalised through the reduction of the number of first-tier suppliers 
and the introduction of a supplier ranking system.  Also, in 1998 Rolls-Royce reorganised itself 
into two types of business units: (a) customer-facing business units with responsibility for 
identifying and meeting customer needs, and (b) operating business units with responsibility for 
delivering sub-systems on time, to cost and to specification.  It was expected that this flatter   15
 
structure would enable clear accountability of the business units (Rolls-Royce Annual Report, 
1998). 
 
This intense and profound restructuring resulted in job-cutting throughout the 1990s.  The 
average number of Rolls-Royce’s employees steadily declined throughout the decade.  In ten 
years there was a net reduction of about 20,000 employees, accounting for about a third of the 
work force in 1990.  Nevertheless, Rolls-Royce has recognised the importance of a committed 
and trained labour force.  For example, the 1996 Annual Report contended that “[ultimately] our 
competitive edge lies not in hardware but in the quality of our people” (Rolls-Royce Annual 
Report, 1996, 17).  The 2000 Annual Report put it more concretely:  “Rolls-Royce is fortunate to 
have extremely talented and dedicated employees.  In the UK, the average length of service is 
approaching 20 years.  This is important in an industry where development and production 
programs may have lives of more than 50 years and in which the customer relationship with an 
individual product may be 25 years or more” (Rolls-Royce Annual Report, 2000, 16). 
 
Over the 1990s the absolute amount of spending on R&D increased constantly, with net R&D as 
a % of sales in the 6-7 % range.  Much of this spending (as we shall see in the next section) was 
aimed at the further development of the RB211.  Over the past few years, the emphasis has been 
on the generation of technologies that can be exploited across the company’s different 
businesses.  Technologies originally developed for aerospace applications are being exploited for 
energy applications and more recently in the marine business (in particular, computational fluid 
dynamics tools are being applied to marine propulsion design).  New technologies are being 
researched to reduce the adverse environmental impacts (in terms of noise and emissions) of 
products. New technologies are also being used to support the more recent move towards the 
provision of customer support and service. 
 
Corporate strategy and the stock market 
As a nationalized company, Rolls-Royce prepared a corporate strategic plan for government 
approval every year, and relied on corporate revenues, short-term and long-term borrowing, and 
government support in the form of defence contracts and “launch aid” (in effect interest-free 
loans from the government) to maintain its organization and fund expansion.  With the 
privatization of the company in May 1987, Rolls-Royce still had access to these sources of 
funds, although launch aid would only be forthcoming if other sources were unavailable.  The 
main difference was that, as a publicly traded company, the management of Rolls-Royce was 
now accountable to the corporation’s public shareholders, the vast majority of whom had a 
purely financial interest in the company.  
 
According to Verchère (1992), after privatization senior managers felt more under public 
scrutiny by the investment community and private shareholders.  As a Rolls-Royce senior 
manager stated: “We’re becoming much more of a financial and accountability culture than 
before” (quoted in Verchère, 1992, 34).  From the beginning of the 1990s Rolls-Royce engaged 
in “a three-tier planning discipline comprising a ten-year review of market trends backed by 
five-year financial and strategic plans” (Verchère, 1992, 34).  The third tier was a two-year 
operating plan and budget that is, in turn, informed by quarterly and four-week financial budgets 
that, according to Verchère (1992, 34) have had “the net effect of tightening financial controls at 
all levels, including the shop floor.”   16
 
 
Yet throughout the 1990s, Rolls-Royce underperformed in the FTSE100, with the gap in stock 
prices increasing perceptibly in the late 1990s (see Figure 1).  But how did Rolls-Royce’s 
exposure to the stock market actually affect strategic decision-making and the allocation of 
resources at the company?  Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2002) provide a framework for analyzing 
the four functions that the stock market can perform in the industrial corporation.  Firstly, it can 
structure the relation between owners and managers in exercising strategic control  over 
corporate allocation decisions.  Secondly, it can provide the corporation with cash that can be 
used to restructure the corporate balance sheet, fund operations (including R&D), invest in plant 
and equipment, or acquire existing physical and intangible assets.  Thirdly, it can provide the 
corporation with its own combination currency that can be used instead of or in addition to cash 
in mergers and acquisitions.  Fourthly, it can provide the corporation with its own compensation 
currency that it can use, instead of or in addition to cash, to reward employees and other 
stakeholders.
vii  As we shall see in the following account of the relation between Rolls-Royce’s 
corporate strategy and the financial markets, the stock market has played all four roles at Rolls-
Royce during the past sixteen years. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
  
Ownership and control  
Privatization of the company in 1987 transferred ownership of the Rolls-Royce shares from the 
British government to institutional investors and households.   Table 1 shows the size 
distribution of holdings of ordinary shares on December 31, 1988 and December 31, 2001.  It is 
worth noting that on December 31, 1968, on the eve of the difficulties that had plunged Rolls-
Royce into bankruptcy, Rolls-Royce had 59,712 shareholders of which 50,742 were individuals 
(who held 46 % of the number of shares outstanding), while 218 were insurance companies, 948 
banks, and 134 pension funds (Bowden, 2002: 41-42).  Twenty years later, as a reprivatized 
company, Rolls-Royce had a vastly increased number of small shareholders, but a smaller 
number of large institutional shareholders held a much larger proportion of the shares 
outstanding. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, from 1988 to 2002 the number of small shareholders declined, 
while the concentration of shareholdings among the largest shareholders – all institutional 
investors – increased dramatically.  Whereas in 1988 the 115 holders of more than one million 
shares had 48 % of Rolls-Royce’s shares, in 2002 the 166 largest shareholders had 80 % of the 
shares.  As of March 6, 2002 the largest shareholder, with holdings of 12.08 % of the 
outstanding ordinary shares, was Franklin Resources, Inc., a major US-based institutional 
investor that manages the Franklin-Templeton investment funds. The second largest shareholder 
was BMW AG with holdings of 9.89 %.  The German automobile company had acquired these 
shares because of Rolls-Royce’s purchase of BMW’s stake in a joint aircraft engine venture. 
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
Notwithstanding the growing concentration of shareholding at Rolls-Royce, throughout the 
period 1987-2003 Rolls-Royce’s management was dominated by insiders who -- protected from 
takeover by the British government’s ‘golden share’ -- remained firmly in control of corporate   17
 
allocation decisions.  The key executive over this period was Sir Ralph Robins.  Upon 
graduating from Imperial College in 1955, Robins, aged 23, had joined the company as an 
apprentice engineer.  He became Managing Director in 1984, Chief Executive in 1991, and 
Chairman in 1992.  A 1999 profile of Robins in The Financial Times noted that “Sir Ralph . . . 
has been in charge throughout the glory years.”  The article went on to say that, while the City 
remains unimpressed with Rolls-Royce’s stock market performance, “no one in the City has a 
bad word to say about the slim, pinstriped, impeccably courteous Sir Ralph.”  The profile went 
on to quote one unnamed City analyst who remarked: “He’s everybody’s favourite uncle.  But 
his priority is to maintain Rolls as an independent British company.  Shareholder value is 
secondary to him” (Shapinker 1997).  Or more recently, as stated in a newspaper report in March 
2002 that followed Robins’ announcement of his retirement: “Sir Ralph Robins, chairman of 
Rolls-Royce, is no great fan of the City or it of him by the look of the 7 per cent surge in the 
Rolls-Royce share price that greeted news of his retirement.” 
 
Like Robins, most of the other top executives at Rolls-Royce in the fifteen years after 
privatization had built their careers with the company.  In October 2001, the person who Michael 
Howse replaced as Director – Engineering and Technology was Philip Ruffles, an engineer who 
had joined the company in 1961 at the age of 23.  In addition, Ruffles’ predecessor as Director – 
Engineering and Technology was Stewart Miller, an engineer who had joined Rolls-Royce in 
1954 at the age of 21 and had been appointed to the Board in 1984 before retiring after 41 years 
of service in 1996.  Counting Robins and Ruffles, of the nine executive directors who were with 
the company in 2001, six had joined the company in 1969 or before at an average age of 22.5 
years and had on average 37 years of service with the company.  Five of these six were 
engineers.  Of the other three, John Rose and Paul Heiden, who joined Rolls-Royce in their 30s, 
both had finance backgrounds, while James Guyette joined the company subsequent to the 
Allison acquisition.  These executives, who effectively control Rolls-Royce’s resource allocation 
decisions, are long-term career managers, and most of them have spent their entire careers with 
Rolls-Royce. 
 
Stock as a source of cash 
Table 2 shows the most important items in Rolls-Royce’s sources and uses of funds since it was 
privatized.  In addition, we have shown the company’s annual net expenditures on R&D, which 
are deducted as an expense on the profit-and-loss statement, thus reducing the “funds from 
operations” figure but which represent in reality an ongoing “capital” expenditure that the 
company must be able to fund if it is to stay in business.  Based on the data in Table 2, Figure 2 
illustrates that for most of the 1990s the company’s funds from operations plus depreciation 
charges were just covering capital expenditures (including acquisition costs) plus dividends.   
Since the late 1990s, however, these sources of funds have been significantly greater than these 
uses, without sacrificing either R&D expenditures or dividend distributions.  
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 shows Rolls-Royce’s main financing activities and external fund raising under 
privatization.  As discussed below, the two public share issues (categorized as PSI in Table 2) 
that Rolls-Royce did in 1993 and 1995 were directly related to technological investments – the 
first case to fund R&D without taking on more debt, and in the second case to fund the   18
 
acquisition of the Allison Engine.  By the late 1990s, when Rolls-Royce carried out the major 
acquisition of Vickers, it turned to the bond market rather than to the stock market for financing. 
 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
Rolls-Royce made substantial profits from 1987 through 1990.   As a result, as can be seen in 
Table 2, from 1987 through 1990 the company’s funds from operations totalled £732 million, 
almost double its total capital expenditures of  £372 million.  In addition, internal funds also 
covered the company’s expenditures on net R&D, which totalled £734 million during the years 
1987-1990. 
 
After the boom years of the late 1980s, a slowdown hit both the military and civil segments of 
the aerospace industry.  After suffering an operating loss of £172 million in 1992, Rolls-Royce 
found itself facing the high costs of both sustaining the development of the high-thrust wide 
body Trent and rationalizing its existing activities.  The first Trent 700 engines for the Airbus 
330 were to be delivered in the winter of 1994, and the higher-thrust Trent 800 that was being 
developed for the Boeing 777 would be tested in September 1993.
viii The rationalization 
program, which was announced in March 1993, entailed the closing of six of twelve of the 
company’s main manufacturing sites and layoffs of 2900 people, a 6% workforce reduction 
(Tieman, 1993). 
  
The company had taken on considerable debt in the lean years of the early 1990s (see Table 2).  
But the company still needed to raise funds from the markets.  According to the report in Extel 
Examiner,  “[Sir Ralph] Robins [the Chairman of Rolls-Royce] said that it was expected that the 
rationalisation program alone will result in a cash outflow of £130 million over this year and 
next.  Against this background Robins said the board had decided to increase the equity base 
thereby restoring it to a level which, in its opinion, is more appropriate to the sales and activity 
of the Group.”
ix Instead of taking on more debt, in September 1993 Rolls-Royce announced a 
rights issue which would raise £307 million net of expenses.  One new share would be offered to 
the company’s existing shareholders for each four shares that they currently held. A Rolls-Royce 
press release explained why the company was going to shareholders for more equity capital: 
 
In July this year the financial resources of the Group were strengthened by a successful 
$300 million bond issue.  However the Board of Rolls-Royce does not wish to place 
undue reliance on bank and other forms of debt financing.  The Board believes it 
appropriate to finance the Group’s long term activities predominantly through equity 
capital rather than debt.  This approach was adopted in the Group’s capital structure at 
the time of privatization in 1987 when the Group came to the stock market with no net 
debt.  The requirement for a rights issue should be seen in the context of turnover which 
has risen from £1973 million in 1988, when shareholders’ funds were £949 million, to 
£3562 million in 1992 on a similar equity base.
x 
 
Rolls-Royce had seen its market share of civil aircraft engines rise from 22 % in 1992 to 28 % in 
the first half of 1993 – placing it just ahead of Pratt & Whitney, and even with General Electric – 
but market conditions, intense competition, and the imperative to sustain R&D raised concerns 
among shareholders about when they would see a resurgence of Rolls-Royce’s share price to its   19
 
post-privatization levels (Tieman, 1993).
xi The Times editorial on the rights-issue announcement 
observed that “Rolls-Royce asks a great deal from its shareholders”.  In The Times full report on 
the condition of Rolls-Royce, reporter Ross Tieman (1993) observed that “the last time Rolls-
Royce needed more cash to develop a new aero-engine, it went bust.  This time it is asking 
shareholders to contribute.”  But Tieman continued: 
 
The need for money is fundamentally different to that which existed 22 years ago, when 
Edward Heath’s government was obliged to bail the company out of its cost over-runs on 
the development of the RB211 airliner engine.  Today, the problem is one of success.   
But ironically, the RB211 is still at the root of Rolls’s financial embarrassment.   
 
Ideally, the prices that Rolls-Royce could secure from the airlines in the new engine market 
would reflect the improvements in reliability that would save on future servicing and 
replacement costs.  But the generally depressed market conditions since 1989 had led airlines to 
ground older planes with “spares-hungry” engines while creating intense competition among the 
Big Three for new orders, including engines for the Boeing 777, in a multisourcing world 
(Tieman, 1993).  It was under such economic conditions that, in 1993, Rolls-Royce went to its 
shareholders for cash. 
 
On the announcement of the rights issue, the price of Rolls-Royce shares fell by almost seven % 
to 152-1/2p.  The rights issue was offered at 130p, a 20.5 % discount from the market price on 
the announcement date.  Those British shareholders who did not want to take up the rights issue 
had a window of opportunity to sell the rights to those who did.  At the same time, foreign 
holdings had reached the maximum of 29.5 %, thus restricting foreign sales (Rudd 1993, 17).
xii  
In the event, the deep discount on the rights issue meant that 87.2 % of the 211.6 million new 
ordinary shares offered were taken up by existing shareholders, with the broker underwriting the 
rest of the issue and offloading the shares at 145p, mainly to two large institutional investors 
(Kibazo et al., 1993, 50).  In the process, the proportion of shares that were foreign-owned 
dropped to 25 % (Pain, 1993, 22).  
  
In January 1995 Rolls-Royce paid $525 million, equivalent to £328 million, to acquire Allison 
Engine Company, a US military engine supplier that had been founded in 1915 and that from 
1929 to 1993 had been a subsidiary of General Motors.  Rolls-Royce had made a previous bid 
for Allison in 1993, but GM had sold the company to a management buyout team for $370 
million.
xiii When Rolls-Royce had announced its plan to buy Allison Engine on November 21, 
1994, the news was, according to Investors Chronicle, “welcomed by the City, with Rolls-
Royce’s share price moving up 2p to 185p.
xiv Financial analysts apparently believed the Allison 
acquisition would be done in Rolls-Royce shares, whose price had risen substantially over the 
past year and which were listed on the New York Stock Exchange in the form of American 
Depository Receipts.
xv  Allison’s current owners were not, however, interested in accepting 
Rolls-Royce’s shares in payment.  To finance the acquisition, therefore, in March 1995 Rolls-
Royce did a £331 million rights issue (net of expenses) – after having raised £307 million from 
shareholders in a rights issue just 18 months earlier – this time offering one ordinary share at 
154p for every 5.4 ordinary shares held on March 16, 1995.  
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The March 1995 rights issue differed significantly from that of September 1993.  Instead of 
offering new shares directly to existing shareholders, Rolls-Royce, through its sole underwriter 
N M Rothschild & Sons, offered the 227.3 million shares to City institutional investors at 154p, 
which was a discount of just over 5 % on the opening price of 164p – and hence less than one-
fourth of the discount that the 1993 rights issue had imposed on the company’s shares (Rodgers 
1995, 17).
       
 
Stock as an acquisition currency 
In late October 1988 Rolls-Royce secretly purchased a 4.7 % stake in Northern Engineering 
Industries (NEI), a power station equipment and heavy engineering group based in Newcastle 
(Garnett, 1988, 33).  Rolls-Royce then entered into talks with NEI concerning a friendly bid for 
the company that would total £360 and be paid mainly in cash, to be covered by Rolls-Royce’s 
cash balances and the proceeds from the Eurobond issue. 
 
Subsequent merger talks between the two companies appeared to have come to an end in late 
December (Gibben, 1988, 19).  When the merger was agreed in April 1989, however, no cash 
was involved.  Between the aborted discussions in December and the merger agreement in April, 
Rolls-Royce’s share price rose from 128p to 185p, an increase of 45 %, that, compared with the 
FTSE100, enabled it to outperform the rising stock market by 29 %.
xvi Instead of cash, seven 
new Rolls-Royce shares were exchanged for every ten NEI shares, thus valuing NEI at £306 
million.
xvii  In using its shares for the merger, Rolls-Royce was able to maintain control over its 
cash flow. 
 
The NEI purchase price represented a 23 % premium over the price of NEI shares on the date 
before the disclosure of Rolls-Royce’s 4.7 % holding in NEI.  The new shares issued by Rolls-
Royce entailed a 16.7 % increase in its issued ordinary share capital, thus placing a substantial 
burden on the NEI acquisition to generate sufficient earnings to maintain existing earnings per 
share.  In 1988 NEI had reported pre-tax profits of £38.5 million, equivalent to 22.9 % of Rolls-
Royce’s level of pre-tax profits in that year.
xviii Thus, the NEI acquisition promised to pay its 
own way.  More importantly, the NEI acquisition started the company on a diversification 
strategy that, as already described, became focused in the last half of the 1990s around the 
application of gas turbine technology to energy and marine uses as well as aerospace. 
 
Alongside Rolls-Royce, Vickers was the other major British engineering company to survive the 
pressures of competition and consolidation over the course of the twentieth century.  Indeed the 
relation between Rolls-Royce and Vickers went back to 1919 when the first non-stop 
transatlantic flight was made in a Vickers Vimy aircraft powered by Rolls-Royce Eagle engines 
(Lister, 1999).  In September 1999, Rolls-Royce announced its proposal to acquire Vickers for 
£576 million in cash -- a premium of 53 % over Vickers’ market capitalization at the time -- in 
order to gain access to its capabilities in marine power systems.
xix  As Sir Ralph Robins told 
reporters: “Our strategy is to get to No. 1 or 2 in the various markets in which we operate.  We 
are there in aerospace, this will put us there in marine” (Cowell, 1999). Vickers shareholders 
were also given the option of receiving, in lieu of cash, Loan Notes issued by Rolls-Royce, 
redeemable at the holder’s option in whole or in part at six-month intervals directly from Rolls-
Royce, but not listed or traded on a stock exchange.
xx With revenues strong in 2000, the 
company was able to reduce substantially the debt taken on to acquire Vickers.   21
 
  
In 1999 Rolls-Royce made three other acquisitions. To build capabilities in the energy sector, it 
acquired the rotating compression business of Cooper Cameron, named Cooper Rolls, for £132 
million in cash.  It acquired National Airmotive, a service and repair facility in Oakland 
California, for £47 million in cash.  Finally on December 31, 1999 Rolls-Royce purchased the 
50.5 % shareholding that BMW AG held in BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH for 33.3 million shares 
and the waiver of a £180 million loan that BMW owed to Rolls-Royce, for a total acquisition 
value of £289 million. The business was renamed Rolls-Royce  Deutschland  GmbH. (Rolls-
Royce Annual Report, 1999).  It was because of this deal that BMW acquired a 10 % stake in 
Rolls-Royce and was, as we have seen, its second largest shareholder as of March 2002. 
 
Stock as a compensation currency 
After its privatization, Rolls-Royce had two stock-based compensation schemes: a) an Employee 
Sharesave Plan that, for example in 1995, was available to about 40 % of the company’s UK 
employees and 30 % of all employees; and b) an Executive Stock Option Plan that covered 46 
senior executives in 1987 and 124 in 1999, but was extended to 363 senior executives in 2000 
(Rolls-Royce Annual Reports, 1988-2001).  Under the executive plan, the vesting period was 
three years with expiration after ten years, and certain company performance criteria had to be 
met before stock options could be exercised.  As stated in the 2000 Annual Report: 
 
Depending on performance, executives are eligible to receive options on an annual basis.  
Options are granted at the mid-market price on the day before the day of issue and 
normally have to be held for a minimum of three years before they are capable of 
exercise.  They expire after ten years.  In line with the [remuneration] committee’s view 
that an increasing proportion of remuneration should be performance related, the exercise 
of options is subject to a performance condition that the Group’s growth in earnings per 
share (EPS) must exceed the UK retail price index by three % per annum, over a three-
year period. 
 
The annual reports provide information on the stock option awards to executive directors, 
including the number of awards in a particular year, exercise prices, and the number of options 
exercised.  From this information it is possible to derive fairly accurate estimates of the extent to 
which executive directors were able to augment their salaried income (which included bonuses) 
through the exercise of stock options.  For example, Sir Ralph Robins was able to increase his 
income over the period 1987-2002 by 7.48 % through the exercise of stock options, while John 
Rose increased his income as an executive director (1991-2002) by 3.48 %.  In fact, most 
options awarded in the early years expired without being exercised.  Nevertheless, at the end of 
2002, Robins had over one million options outstanding and Rose over 2.3 million. 
 
Over the period 1987-2002, executive directors received increasingly generous pay even without 
gains from the exercise of stock options, as Table 3 shows.  In 1987 the pay of the highest paid 
Rolls-Royce executive was 9.0 times that of the average pay of all Rolls-Royce employees, 
while the average pay of all executive directors was 6.1 times that of all employees.  By 2002 
these figures had risen to 28.9 and 18.2.  In addition, in 2001, and in certain cases for 2000, 
executive directors began receiving quantities of stock option awards that were far in excess of 
what they had received previously.  For example, perhaps as a retirement bonus, Robins received   22
 
1,025,618 option awards in 2001, up from 172,674 in 2000 and a previous high of 694,618 in 
1995.  Rose received 1,680,702 option awards in 2001, up from 408,276 in 2000 and a previous 
high of 355,392 in 1995 (Rolls-Royce Annual Reports).  In 2002, Rose received 638,298 more 
options. 
 
Insert table 3 about here 
 
Conclusions: is Rolls-Royce a success story? 
This case study shows that despite dramatic changes in the forms of enterprise ownership from 
the 1960s through the 1990s, Rolls-Royce was able to remain one of the Big Three in the 
turbofan industry.  Because of continuous investments in the three-shaft RB211 program from 
the mid-1960s through the 1990s, the company was able to emerge as the industry’s 
technological leader in widebody engines, notwithstanding the fact that it was Rolls-Royce’s 
initial investments in this program that helped to drive the company into bankruptcy at the 
beginning of the 1970s. 
 
We argue that the continuity of this development effort can only be understood in terms of the 
influence of the company’s engineers, as strategic decision-makers, over the allocation of the 
company’s resources.  As salaried employees, their own careers depended on the success of the 
company in developing jet engines.  In pursuing this developmental strategy, they made use of 
government financial support, especially during the period of nationalization, but not at the cost 
of surrendering their positions of strategic control.  Subsequent to the company’s 1987 
privatization, Rolls-Royce’s executives have made astute use of financial markets to fund 
acquisitions and further technological development while avoiding both loss of strategic control 
and the threat of bankruptcy.  Indeed, it would appear that the career advancement of the current 
CEO, John Rose, who joined Rolls-Royce in 1984 at the age of 32 with a background in finance, 
was bound up with the successful financial engineering of the 1990s, and in particular the two 
rights issues of 1993 and 1995.  Fundamentally, however, the success of the company over the 
last decade and a half derives from the sustained development of the RB211, a process that was 
begun in the last half of the 1960s and continued through the end of the century. 
 
While Rolls-Royce is an exceptional case in the British context, from a comparative-historical 
perspective on the role of salaried managers in exercising strategic control over corporate 
resource allocation in high fixed cost, knowledge-intensive industries, Rolls-Royce’s history is 
by no means unique (see Chandler et al., 1997).  It is career managers, not public shareholders or 
government bureaucrats, who have the understanding of the technologies, markets, and 
competitors in a complex-product industry required to make strategic allocation decisions that 
stand any chance of generating successful outcomes.  At the outset, investments in innovation in 
such industries are inherently uncertain.  The role of strategic managers is not only to make 
investments in the face of uncertainty but also to immerse themselves in an ongoing learning 
process about developing technologies, accessing markets, and confronting competitors that can 
transform uncertainty into economic success. 
 
As outsiders to the industrial corporation, public shareholders are ill-positioned to be involved in 
these strategic decision-making processes, and indeed if they were obliged to be so involved 
they would probably rather sell their shares.  In this regard, Rolls-Royce’s shareholders, both   23
 
before the bankruptcy and after privatization, were no exception.  The question for them has 
always been when, not whether, to buy and sell “ownership” stakes in the company, and in this 
activity different shareholders of the same company often take very different actions.  Bowden 
(2002, 44), for example, shows that from 1968 to 1969, as Rolls-Royce’s seemingly strong 
financial condition eroded, four major institutional shareholders (including the largest, 
Prudential Insurance, with holdings in 1968 that were greater than those of the next seven largest 
shareholders combined) sold their entire holdings while ten others increased the size of their 
holdings, in many cases substantially.  Bowden (2002, 49-51) also recounts how, as Rolls-
Royce’s financial difficulties deepened in 1970, it was the banks, not the shareholders, who 
became involved in the affairs of the company. 
 
Since privatization, as we have seen, shareholding in Rolls-Royce has become increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors.  What have they gained?  From 1988 
through 2002, the average real dividend yield on Rolls-Royce’s shares was –1.3 %, ranging from 
–6.6 % in 1990 to 2.0 % in 2001.  In 2001-2002, dividends per share were 64 % higher than they 
were in 1992-1995.  But with the company’s dismal stock-price performance since 1997, the real 
annual total yield (dividend yield plus price yield adjusted for inflation) on Rolls-Royce’s stock 
has averaged –13.2 % for 1997-2002 compared with an average of 6.8 % for 1988-1996.  For 
1988-2002, the average annual real total yield on Rolls-Royce’s shares was –3.2 %.  Whatever 
else it has been doing since privatization, the company clearly has not been creating value for 
shareholders. Particularly for the most recent period, therefore, a proponent of agency theory 
might argue that in fact Rolls-Royce’s competitive success – it raised its market share of the civil 
engine market from eight % in 1987 to about 30 % in 2002 -- represents a case of entrenched 
management squandering resources that could have been used more productively elsewhere in 
the economy.   
 
The problem with such a view is that, whatever its stock market performance, Rolls-Royce is a 
company that, because of sustained investment in its productive resources, has a technological 
capability that took decades to develop and that no other company in the world can replicate. 
The company has been persistently profitable with underlying real earnings per share being 
somewhat higher in 1997-2002 (when stock price performance has been poor) than in 1988-
1996.  The company provides productive employment to over 39,000 people, of whom the 
24,000 in Britain would have by no means been certain of finding another employer in the UK 
that could have provided them with equivalent career opportunities.  The average real annual 
earnings of these employees were over 50 % higher in 2000-02 than they were in 1990-92.  
While beyond the scope of this paper, the development of Rolls-Royce’s capability clearly has 
had spillover effects that, especially through their effects on resources available in the British 
university system, have been beneficial to the training of engineers outside Rolls-Royce as well 
as to the technological capabilities of other engineering companies.  It may well be that in the 
future, Rolls-Royce’s top management may become more concerned with their own emoluments 
(as the British say) than with generating returns on the company’s human and physical resources 
– and in this regard the tripling of average executive director pay in relation to average employee 
pay from 1987 to 2002 may be a cause of concern.  But there is little doubt that over the past 
several decades the entrenched control of Rolls-Royce’s managers over the strategic allocation 
of the company’s resources has resulted in the creation of valuable and unique productive 
capabilities that certainly the British economy would not otherwise have possessed.   24
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   Table 1. Size Distribution of Ordinary Shareholdings 
                 31 Dec. 1988, 31 Dec. 1991, and 31 Dec. 2002 
 
                             December 31, 1988                   December 31, 1991                   December 31, 2002 



























1-150 612,545  72.32  11.43  345,974  58.21 5.26  119,263  37.06 0.94 
151-500        200,769  33.78 4.63  155,370  48.27 2.48 
151-1,000  210,226  24.82  8.28         
501-10,000       45,521  7.66 8.66 45,157  14.03 5.07 
1,001-10,000  22,491  2.66  6.88         
10,001-100,000 1,099  0.13  5.00  1,348  0.23 4.71  1,457  0.45 2.49 
100,001-1,000,000 474  0.06  20.34  574 0.10  21.34  463 0.14  9.25 
1,000,001 and over  115  0.01  48.07  149  0.02 55.96  166  0.05 79.77 
TOTAL  846,950     100.00  100.00  594,335  100.0  100.0  321,876      100.00  100.00 
  * The 1988-1990 annual reports provide data on shareholding for those with 151-1,000 shares and 1,001-10,000 while the 1991-2002 
annual reports provide data on shareholding for those with 151-500 shares and 501-10,000 shares.    
Sources: Rolls-Royce Annual Report 1988, 34; Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2001, 72.   30
 
 
Table 2.  Rolls-Royce plc, Sources and uses of funds, 1987-2002 (selected items) 
 
































FFO  611  418 479 392 395 311 182 193  41 37 124 100 254 278 217 191
DEP  236  198 238 110 113  92 103 116 109 105 104  64  69 55 43 41
LTB  151  69 510 734 177  2  69  4  0 208 181 335 161 162 155 9
∆LTD  103  67 -223 530 162  -5  59  -150 -76 48  3 174 -1 -38 146 -70
∆STD  -155  39 -146 91  -19 65  0 17  6 -29  214 57 48 -62 -2 -163
SS0  1  16 10 4  14 4  18  15 4 8 0 4 1 0 0 0
PSI  0  00  0000 3 3 20 3 1 7000 0 0 274
DFA  41  168 46  187  213 89 52  153 40 38 12 15 19 8 4 2
       
USES       
CPX  314  211 292 381 387 222 142  94 105 130 126 119 1 1 2  1 1 36 58 2
AOA  28  1 45 653  0 9 3 217  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RLTD   48  2 733  204 15  7 10  154 76 160  178  161 162 200 9 79
CDS  109 84 74 88 65 78 69 57 51 44 64 45 69 55 45 14
       
       
Net R&D*  297  358 371 337 310 268 217 206 218 253 229 216 237 161 149 187
 
FFO = Funds from operations; DEP = Depreciation; LTB = Long-term borrowing;  
∆LTD = Change in long-term debt (=LTB-RLTD); ∆STD=Change in short-term debt;  
SS0 = Sale of ordinary shares to employees exercising options;  
PSI = issue of ordinary shares to the public (net of expenses); 
DFA = Disposal fixed assets; CPX - Capital expenditures; AOA = Acquisition of assets;  
RLTD = Reduction of long-term debt; CDS = Cash dividends 
 
* As an operations expense, the cost of net R&D is covered by revenues that are deducted in arriving at the “funds from 
operations” figure, and is not an item in the cash flow (i.e., “sources and uses of funds”) accounts.  Given its importance to the 
company, however, the net R&D figures are included in Table 9 so that they can be compared with the cash flow items that are 
in the sources and uses accounts. 
NA = not available 




Table 3.  The Relative Pay of Rolls-Royce Executives and Rolls-Royce Employees, 1987-2001. 
              
                   Sources: Rolls-Royce Annual Reports 1987-2002. 
Year  Pay of Highest-Paid Executive 
to Average Pay of All 
Employees 
Average Pay of Executive 
Directors to Average Pay of 
All Employees 
1987 9.0  6.1 
1988 11.2  6.9 
1989 12.5  6.6 
1990 14.8  9.5 
1991 14.3  7.7 
1992 14.4  9.7 
1993 14.5  10.6 
1994 16.6  11.0 
1995 13.3  9.3 
1996 14.4  10.7 
1997 19.2  12.7 
1998 18.5  13.0 
1999 18.9  14.9 
2000 20.1  13.2 
2001 25.0  16.5 


































































Figure 1. Stock price indices, Rolls-Royce plc and FTSE100,
               Sept. 1987-Sept. 2003 (adjusted close on the first trading

















































Figure 2. Rolls-Royce: Sources and Uses of Funds 1987-2002
FFO=funds from operations; NRD=net R&D; DEP=depreciation
CPX=capital expenditures; CDS=cash dividends;















































Figure 3. Rolls-Royce: External Funding 1987-2002
£m
AOA=acquisition of assets; DFA=disposal of assets
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ii See also ‘Rolls-Royce: middle-man or medler?, The Economist, December 27, 1975, 42; ‘National 
Enterprise Board: Rolls-Royce of a problem,’ The Economist, February 11, 1978, 112. 
iii ‘NEB and Rolls-Royce: Who needs a lame-duck hospital?’ The Economist, November 17, 1979, 108. 
iv See ‘Industrial policy: Mrs Thatcher's awkward inheritance,’ The Economist, May 5, 1979, 120; 
‘Rolls under Whitehall's wing,’ The Economist, November 24, 1979, 83. 
v ‘The real problem is money,’ The Economist, November 17, 1979, 108. 
vi ‘Investor Limit Up at Rolls-Royce,’ New York Times, July 20, 1989, D5; “BAe, Rolls-Royce foreign 
ownership limit raised to 49.5 pct from 29.5, AFX News, March 12, 1998.   
vii For an application of this framework, see Carpenter et al. (2003). 
viii ‘Rolls-Royce plc Interim Results 1993,’ PR Newswire European, September 2, 1993. 
ix ‘Royce-Royce 1 – Right Issue Offsets Rationalisation Costs,’ Extel Examiner, September 2, 1993. 
x ‘Official Correction: Rolls-Royce – Rights Issue,’ Extel Examiner, September 2, 1993. 
xi ‘Extel Financial Exclusive: Rolls-Royce to Fund “R&D at Highest level Ever” – Chairman,’ Extel 
Examiner, September 2, 1993. 
xii Some foreign investors had already been forced to sell their holdings to comply with the limit.  
Meanwhile Rolls-Royce lodged a request with the government to raise the limit to 49.5 %. 
xiii ‘Rolls-Royce Buys Allison Engine.’ European Information Service, January 5, 1995; ‘Clayton, 
Dubilier & Rice Completes Sale of Allison Engine Company to Rolls-Royce,’ PR Newswire, March 
24, 1995. 
xiv ‘Popular Shares: R-R ahead of Allison OK,’ Investors Chronicle, February 10, 1995, 54. 
xv ADRs track a foreign-based company’s share-price movements on its home stock market, but 
obviate the need for US holders of these securities to assume the exchange-rate risk of holding the 
actual shares. 
xvi ‘View from City Road: NEI an “add-on” for Rolls-Royce,’ The Independent, April 11, 1989, 25. 
xvii ‘Rolls-Royce and NEI to Merge,’ PR Newswire European, April 10, 1989. Also N. Garnett, “Rolls-
Royce to But NEI in Deal Worth £300 Million,” Financial Times, April 11, 1989, 1. 
xviii Ibid. 
xix “Rolls-Royce plc: Proposed recommended offer for Vickers plc from company for £576m,” Global 
News Wire, September 20, 1999. 
xx “Vickers plc – Recommended cash offer – Part 1,” Regulatory News Service, September 20, 1999. 